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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Brian Calder Kerr appeals from the district court’s ruling affirming the
magistrate’s judgment.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Kerr shot an elk while hunting and trespassed onto private property in
order to retrieve it. (R., pp. 35-36.) He was cited for the misdemeanor charge of
trespassing on private property to retrieve wildlife. (R., p. 4.)
Kerr entered a guilty plea as part of a settlement agreement with the state.
(R., pp. 5-7.) The parties appeared to agree on Kerr’s sentence as spelled out in
the plea agreement; however, they disputed a term of the sentence that “fish and
game will confiscate the bull elk.” (Compare R., p. 7 with R., pp. 8-11.) At
sentencing, the state presented evidence and argued the elk should be
confiscated by the state. (See R., pp. 8-9, 18.) Kerr, on the other hand, “argued
that he ought to be able to keep the elk despite his trespass” and that the
confiscation statute “was inapplicable to his case.”

(R., pp. 9-11, 17.)

The

magistrate imposed the sentence and ordered the confiscation, but allowed a
subsequent “motion to reconsider” the confiscation issue. (R., pp. 11-12.) Kerr
filed supplemental briefing and noticed a hearing on the matter. (See R., p. 2.)
The magistrate issued a memorandum decision resolving the confiscation
issue. (R., pp. 17-23.) The magistrate’s findings, adopted and relied on by the
state on appeal, included the following:

1

There is no question that Kerr trespassed onto another person’s
property, which was cultivated land, in order to retrieve a bull elk
that had been shot. Those facts are not in dispute because that is
what Kerr was charged with and to which he pled guilty.
…
…To the extent Kerr asks this Court to accept his version that he
shot the elk lawfully, this Court declines to make that factual
finding. Likewise, to the extent the State asks this Court to look at
the evidence presented at sentencing and make a factual finding
that he shot the elk while in the act of trespassing, this Court
declines to make that factual finding.[1]
What the Court finds factually is that Kerr shot a bull elk which died
on someone’s private property. Kerr trespassed onto that property
to retrieve the elk. The issue thus becomes: does [the confiscation
statute] apply to these facts?
(R., pp. 18-19.)

1

Kerr takes for granted on appeal that it is an “incontrovertible fact that Kerr had
already lawfully ‘taken’ the animal” prior to trespassing. (Appellant’s brief, p. 15;
see also Appellant’s brief, pp. 13 (“Here, that after Kerr had lawfully taken and
possessed an elk…”), 14 (“Here, Kerr pled guilty to trespassing for the purpose
of retrieving wildlife (an elk) that, pursuant to the plain language of the statute, he
had already lawfully taken.”), 17 (“Significantly, the magistrate court indirectly
recognized the problem of creating the impossible circumstance of two ‘takings’
and the question of whether Kerr could ‘unlawfully take’ an animal that he had
already ‘lawfully taken’….”).) However, the magistrate expressly declined to
make that factual finding. (R., pp. 18-19.) The state contends, as the magistrate
and district court apparently found, that the issues on appeal can be resolved
without finding whether Kerr lawfully possessed the elk prior to the trespass.
(See R., pp. 20, 38-39.) However, if this Court determines this fact is relevant,
the proper remedy would be a remand for the magistrate to make a finding as to
whether Kerr initially lawfully took the elk, as opposed to reversing the
confiscation order based on a factual finding that the magistrate specifically
declined to make.
2

The magistrate determined that the confiscation statute would apply to
these facts, because if the elk “was unlawfully taken by Kerr then it is subject to
confiscation,” and here “Kerr’s action in trespassing was for the sole purpose of
possessing an elk that he had shot.”

(R., pp 19-20.) In other words, “Kerr

trespassed (went onto someone else’s property unlawfully) in order to possess
(take) an elk,” and “[t]herefore, the elk was ‘unlawfully taken’ by Kerr while he
was actively trespassing,” subjecting the elk to confiscation. (R., p. 20.)
Kerr appealed to the district court, arguing the magistrate misapplied the
statute, and for the first time argued that Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) is
“unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable as to the Defendant.” (R., pp. 2425.)
In its Order Establishing Appellate Procedure the district court found “this
appeal involves only a question of law,” namely, “whether, under I.C. § 361304(b), an elk was ‘taken unlawfully’ by the defendant or was ‘unlawfully in the
[defendant’s] possession’ where the defendant lawfully shot the elk while it was
on private land, but before dying the elk moved onto private land, upon which the
defendant unlawfully trespassed to retrieve it.” (R., p. 27.) The district court also
noted the previously unpresented void-for-vagueness issue, and indicated it
would not consider it on appeal unless Kerr sought reconsideration of the Order
Establishing Appellate Procedure and contended “he raised the issue before [the
magistrate], or that the issue for some reason may be raised for the first time on
appeal.” (R., p. 27, n. 1.)

3

Following a hearing on the intermediate appeal (R., pp. 32-34), the district
court affirmed the magistrate’s order (R., pp. 35-48). The district court noted that
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 36-1304(b)(i) “Fish and Game may confiscate
any wildlife ‘taken unlawfully.’” (R., p. 37.) The district court also pointed out that
“[i]n this context, ‘take’ means, among other things, ‘hunt, pursue, … shoot,
…kill, or possess or any attempt to do so.’” (R., p. 37 (emphasis and ellipses in
original, quoting I.C. § 36-202(i).) The district court accordingly concluded that:
It follows that Fish and Game may confiscate an elk from a hunter
who unlawfully hunted it, unlawfully pursued it, unlawfully shot it,
unlawfully killed it, or unlawfully possessed it, or who unlawfully
attempted to do any of those things. The hunter might have done
one or more of those things lawfully, but doing any one of them
unlawfully subjects him to confiscation of his kill. By his own
admission, Kerr acted unlawfully in gaining possession of the elk
he shot. That is the bottom-line reason the magistrate’s decision
was correct and Kerr’s appeal fails.
(R., p. 38 (emphasis in original).)
While finding “the case is straightforward enough that the Court could end
its analysis there,” the district court nevertheless addressed the rest of Kerr’s
arguments in detail. (R., p. 38.) Regarding Kerr’s contention that he initially shot
the elk lawfully on public land, the court noted that the magistrate made no
factual finding as to whether Kerr did so. (R., p. 38.) The district court instead
concluded the magistrate took the fact of an initial lawful shooting “as a given” for
the purposes of a legal analysis, because “[i]t didn’t matter whether Kerr shot the
elk lawfully” when “after shooting it he proceeded to possess it unlawfully.” (R.,
p. 38.) “Thus,” the court found, “even assuming he shot the elk lawfully, he

4

unlawfully possessed it, triggering Fish and Game’s confiscation right under
section 36-1304(b)(i).” (R., p. 38 (emphasis in original).)
The district court also found there were two procedural bars to raising a
void-for-vagueness claim on intermediate appeal: first, Kerr did not raise the
issue to the magistrate, and second, Kerr failed to argue that the alleged error
was “fundamental error” until his reply brief, preventing the state from briefing the
issue in its response. (R., pp. 40-41.) The district court further concluded that
even if the void-for-vagueness claim was not procedurally barred it failed on the
merits.

(R., p. 42.)

The district court accordingly affirmed the magistrate’s

decision upholding the confiscation order. (R., p. 42.)
Kerr timely appealed. (R., pp. 44-46.)

5

ISSUES
Kerr states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Is Idaho Code § 36-1304(b), read together with the definition
provided in Idaho Code § 36-202(i), unconstitutionally vague and
unenforceable?

II.

Did the Magistrate Court misapply Idaho Code § 36-1304(b), where
there was no finding that the Appellant took game illegally (or
illegally possessed game) prior to the trespass?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
I.

Has Kerr failed to show the district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s
denial of Kerr’s motion to reconsider the judgment?

II.

Has Kerr failed to show it was fundamental error for the magistrate to not
sua sponte rule Idaho Code § 36-1304 unconstitutional?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
Kerr Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Affirming The Magistrate’s
Denial Of Kerr’s Motion To Reconsider The Judgment
A.

Introduction
Kerr argues the magistrate and district court misapplied Idaho Code

Sections 36-1304(b) and 36-202. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-20.) This argument
fails because the undisputed evidence before the magistrate was that Kerr
unlawfully trespassed while retrieving the elk at issue. Per the plain language of
the statutes, that constituted an unlawful taking and subjected the elk to
confiscation by the department of Fish and Game. The district court therefore
correctly affirmed the magistrate’s denial of Kerr’s motion to reconsider the
confiscation order.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court “directly reviews the district court’s decision” when the district

court acts in its intermediate appellate capacity. In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243, 248,
207 P.3d 974, 979 (2009) (citing State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d
215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008); Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758
(2008)). This Court reviews the magistrate record “to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact
and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.” In
re Doe, 147 Idaho at 248, 207 P.3d at 979. “If those findings are so supported
and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the
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magistrate’s decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district court’s decision as
a matter of procedure.” Id.
C.

Because Kerr Indisputably Unlawfully Trespassed When He Took The
Elk, The Plain Language Of The Statutes Subjected The Elk To
Confiscation
An Idaho Fish and Game official “may at any time seize and take into his

custody any wildlife or any portion thereof which may have been taken
unlawfully, or which may be unlawfully in the possession of any person.” I.C.
§ 36-1304(b)(i). If the evidence before a magistrate shows “said wildlife was
unlawfully taken,” the magistrate shall order “the same confiscated or sold by the
director.” I.C. § 36-1304(b)(i)(1).
The meaning of “take,” as used above, can be found in Idaho Code 36202, which provides definitions for “[w]henever the following words appear in title
36.” “Take,” so defined, means to “hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot, fish,
seine, trap, kill, or possess or any attempt to do so.” I.C. § 36-202(i). Because
disjunctives such as “or” introduce alternatives (State v. Herren, 157 Idaho 722,
726, 339 P.3d 1126, 1130 (2014)), one can take wildlife by shooting it, or killing
it, or possessing it, or attempting to possess it.
Here, Kerr pleaded guilty (R., pp. 5, 7) to “enter[ing] the real property of
another … for the purposes of … retrieving wildlife … without the permission of
the owner.” I.C. § 36-1603(a). (See also, R., p. 4.) “Retrieving” or “attempting to
retrieve” something is synonymous with possession or attempted possession,
and here Kerr possessed or attempted to possess the elk while actively
unlawfully trespassing on cultivated private property. (See R., pp. 4-5, 19.) The
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magistrate therefore had more than enough evidence to determine that Kerr
unlawfully took the elk, thus subjecting the elk to confiscation.
Kerr’s arguments against this inevitable conclusion are unavailing. The
core of Kerr’s claim is that because he already lawfully took the elk prior to
trespassing, a second, post-trespass taking of “something already taken”
constitutes “impossible physics.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5, 13-16.)

Kerr

characterizes the magistrate’s application of Sections 36-1404 and 36-202 to
these facts as “creating the impossible circumstance of two ‘takings’ and the
question of whether Kerr could ‘unlawfully take’ and animal that had already
been ‘lawfully taken.’”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)

Kerr therefore argues the

magistrate misapplied the law when it “reasoned that the physical impossibility of
two takings did not matter,” and concluded Kerr could have taken the elk both by
2
shooting it and by possessing it. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5, 19-20.)

This argument fails because “[l]egislative definitions of terms included
within a statute control and dictate the meaning of those terms as used in the
statute.” State v. Hartzell, 155 Idaho 107, 110, 305 P.3d 551, 554 (Ct. App.
2013). Title 36 specifically defines a taking as something that can be done via

Kerr also claims, alternatively, that the magistrate erred by not concluding that
the initial shooting and killing of the elk was a taking. (Appellant’s brief, p. 18.)
But this claim is belied by the magistrate’s statement that “[u]nder the broad
definition of “take” it is also true that Kerr did a taking when he shot or killed the
elk.” (R., p. 20.) Far from concluding that the shooting was not a taking, the
magistrate simply concluded that “[t]he fact that he took the elk by shooting it
(perhaps prior to trespassing if his account is to be believed) does nothing to
diminish or wash away the taint of the taking Kerr engaged in when he
trespassed to possess the elk.” (R., p. 20.) Thus, Kerr fails to show that the
magistrate found that the shooting was not a taking, much less that such a
finding would be reversible error.
2

9

multiple non-exclusive acts. I.C. § 36-202(i). One could shoot an animal, pursue
it, hurt it, kill it, catch it, possess it, or attempt to do any of the above, and by
performing each separate act a person would “take” the animal as defined by the
statute. Id. The statute places no explicit or implicit limits on the amount of
times one may take an animal. See id. It is clearly physically possible to both
shoot something, and later possess it, as Kerr did here—and given the statutory
definition of “take” both of these acts would be takings.
Kerr appears to be applying a non-statutory definition of “take” when he
claims something cannot be taken more than once. But statutory definitions
control: the law routinely defines non-human corporations as “persons” (see,
e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1), non-possession as “constructive possession” (see, e.g.,
Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (2015)), and the impact of
land-use regulations as “takings” (see, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992)), to name just a few.

Challenging these legal

definitions in a court of law for “physical impossibility” would be as nonsensical
as enjoining chemical processes in a laboratory for legal reasons. In any event,
Kerr fails to show that “physical impossibility” has any bearing on statutory
interpretation, much less that taking wildlife multiple times through different acts
is impossible, or that the statutory definition of “take” was incorrectly applied
here.
Because the taking by possession occurred while Kerr was indisputably
unlawfully trespassing, he unlawfully took the elk and subjected it to confiscation.
The magistrate correctly applied the law to the facts when it arrived at this same

10

conclusion, and this Court should therefore affirm the district court as a matter of
course.
II.
Kerr Has Failed To Show It Was Fundamental Error For The Magistrate To Not
Sua Sponte Rule Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 Unconstitutional
A.

Introduction
Kerr argues that Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 are void for

vagueness.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-16.)

Covering familiar ground, Kerr

contends that “it is simply not reasonable for him to believe that he could be
penalized for what would have to be a second ‘taking,’” and therefore “the statute
is ambiguous and fails to provide notice.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)
But because Kerr never argued the statute was unconstitutional before
the magistrate, he must show that it was fundamental error for the magistrate to
not sua sponte rule the statute unconstitutional.

Moreover, Kerr waived his

fundamental error argument by not raising it to the district court in his opening
briefing, and fails to challenge that finding on appeal. Lastly, should his claim be
preserved, Kerr still fails to show the district court erred by ruling in the
alternative and dismissing his constitutional claim on the merits.
B.

Standard Of Review
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged the appellate court

reviews it de novo. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131
(2003). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome
a strong presumption of constitutionality. Id. The appellate court is obligated to
seek a construction of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. Id.
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C.

It Was Not Fundamental Error For The Magistrate To Not Sua Sponte
Rule Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 Unconstitutional
“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal,

and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to
the lower court.” State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, No. 44443, 2017 WL 2569786, at *3
(Idaho, June 14, 2017) (citing Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, By & Through
Dep’t of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799–800, 589 P.2d 540, 546–47 (1979);
Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 119, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005); Frasier v.
Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 82, 437 P.2d 32, 35 (1968)) (“We have held generally that
this court will not review issues not presented in the trial court, and that parties
will be held to the theory on which the cause was tried.”).

A well-settled

exception to this doctrine is that appellate courts may “consider a claim of error
to which no objection was made below if the issue presented rises to the level of
fundamental error.” State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 912, 265 P.3d 519, 525
(Ct. App. 2011).
Here, a review of the record shows that Kerr did not present an argument
to the magistrate that the statute was void for vagueness or otherwise
unconstitutional on its face or as applied to him. 3 (See R., pp. 8-11.)

The

magistrate accordingly never ruled on the question. (See R., pp. 17-22; State v.
Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 557, 224 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Ct. App. 2010) (“In order for

3

The state’s review of Kerr’s claims below is limited to the record Kerr has
supplied on appeal, which contains no transcripts, none of Kerr’s briefing to the
magistrate in support of his motion, and none of the parties’ briefing to the district
court. (See generally, R.) “In the absence of an adequate record on appeal to
support the appellant's claims, we will not presume error.” State v. Tregeagle,
161 Idaho 763, ___, 391 P.3d 21, 26 (Ct. App. 2017).
12

an issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling that
forms the basis for the assignment of error.”) (citations omitted).)
Kerr disagrees on appeal, arguing that he presented a void-for-vagueness
claim to the magistrate:
Directly stated, Kerr asserts that the district court is mistaken and
directs this Court to the language of the May 31, 2016
Memorandum Decision. Indeed the magistrate court acknowledged
that “Kerr’s other argument” was whether “the Legislature did not
specifically detail the application of I.C. § 36-1304(b)….” (See R.,
p.21 (Memorandum Decision, p. 5).) Whether the Idaho Legislature
erred by not providing specific detail for the application of Idaho
Code § 36-1304(b) is a void for vagueness argument. Accordingly,
the issue was raised below, and the district court’s determination
that the issue was not raised below is without basis.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.) Putting aside the issue of whether the magistrate’s
paraphrase of a party’s claim is proof the party itself raised an issue below, this
partial quote of the magistrate fails to show Kerr raised a void-for-vagueness
claim. Indeed, scrutinizing the entire passage shows that the magistrate was
only responding to Kerr’s argument regarding the application of one statute to
another:
Kerr then reasons that I.C. § 36-1304(b) was only intended to apply
to convictions of specific crimes of “illegal taking” or “illegal
possession.” Kerr also argues that because the Legislature did
not detail the application of the confiscation statute to the
trespassing statute that the Legislature did not intend for it to
apply.
Contrary to Kerr’s narrow reading, I.C. § 36-1304(b) is not tied to or
limited to convictions of particular offenses. By its plain language,
I.C. § 1304(b) is a statute of broad applicability across the
spectrum of Fish and Game cases. It is a statute unrelated to
penalties – rather, it provides the authority for the Department of
Fish and Game to dispose of wildlife. Presumably, the rationale is
that those who violate the law while hunting, fishing, trapping, etc.
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ought not to profit from or get to keep the fruits of their illegal
activity.
Kerr’s other argument that the Legislature did not specially
detail the application of I.C. § 36-1304(b) helps make the point.
The Legislature did not detail the application of I.C. § 361304(b) to any particular section of the code. That is, of course,
because it is generally applicable whenever unlawfully taken
wildlife is involved.
(R., p. 21 (italic emphasis in original, boldface emphasis added).)

In other

words, simply because the magistrate used the word “detail” in dispatching Kerr’s
statutory application argument, does not mean that Kerr argued the statute was
void for vagueness or otherwise unconstitutional below. Because Kerr did not
present a void-for-vagueness argument to the magistrate he must show the
magistrate committed fundamental error by not sua sponte ruling the statute
unconstitutional.
As a separate procedural matter, Kerr waived his fundamental error claim
below by waiting until his reply brief to raise it.4

(R., p. 41 (noting that on

intermediate appeal “Kerr waited until filling his reply brief to begin arguing that
this alleged error is ‘fundamental error’”).) The district court ruled that this was
too late to consider the issue:
Kerr faces two procedural bars, one for waiting until appeal to raise
his void-for-vagueness argument and the other for waiting until his
reply brief on appeal to characterize as “fundamental error” the
magistrate’s failure to sua sponte find the confiscation statute
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.

Here too, the state’s review of the claims Kerr brought below is limited to the
record Kerr has supplied on appeal, which does not include his opening briefing
to the district court, but does include the district court’s ruling on his intermediate
appeal. (See R., pp. 40-41.)
4

14

There is no good reason Kerr should be permitted to avoid the
effect of the latter of those two procedural bars. In its order
establishing the procedures for this appeal, the Court expressly
noted Kerr’s failure to raise his void-for-vagueness argument
before the magistrate and his consequent inability to assert that
issue on appeal. Thus, Kerr was on notice before the briefing
schedule began that the Court regard the void-for-vagueness issue
as untimely. If he wished to pursue that issue anyway, he should’ve
argued in his opening brief that the “fundamental error” doctrine
permits him to do so. His failure to make that argument at the
appropriate time prevented the State from briefing whether alleged
error is reviewable as “fundamental error.” The latter procedural bar
therefore thus eliminates the need to address whether Kerr can
avoid the effect of the former procedural bar by characterizing the
alleged error as “fundamental error.”
(R., p. 41 (citing Gordon v. Hedrick, 159 Idaho 604, 612, 364 P.3d 951, 959
(2015)).
On appeal, Kerr has failed to address the fact that he waited until his reply
brief to raise fundamental error claim, much less does he claim that the district
court’s preservation ruling was incorrect.

(See Appellant’s brief pp. 10-12

(addressing whether Kerr raised the argument before the magistrate, but not
whether Kerr raised the issue to the district court prior to his reply briefing).) To
preserve arguments on appeal parties must raise issues in their opening briefs.
Patterson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 321, 256 P.3d 718,
729 (2011) (“In order to be considered by this Court, the appellant is required to
identify legal issues and provide authorities supporting the arguments in the
opening brief.”) Because Kerr neglected to raise the fundamental error claim in
his opening brief on intermediate appeal—and likewise fails to challenge the
district court’s preservation ruling in his opening brief on direct appeal—he has
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waived a challenge to the district court’s ruling that he failed to preserve his
fundamental error claim by not raising it in his opening brief.
Turning to the merits, assuming arguendo Kerr has preserved his claim,
fundamental error is an error that “so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces
manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to due
process.” State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). In order
to constitute fundamental error the defendant must show that the error:
“(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights;
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). Kerr cannot show fundamental error because he
cannot show that his constitutional rights were violated, much less clearly so.
1.

Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 Do Not Violate Kerr’s
Unwaived Constitutional Rights, As They Are Not Void For
Vagueness

Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 are not void for vagueness.
“[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.”

State v. Knutsen, 158 Idaho 199, 202,

345 P.3d 989, 992 (2015) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357
(1983)).

“[T]he more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual

notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a
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legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’” Id. (quoting
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358).
As a constitutional matter “[a] conviction or punishment fails to comply
with due process if the statute or regulation under which it is obtained ‘fails to
provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so
standardless

that

it

authorizes

or

encourages

seriously

discriminatory

enforcement.’” F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012)
(quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). Accordingly, “the
void-for-vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and
(2) arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions.” Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S.
358, 412 (2010) (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357). But the doctrine also grants
statutes a “strong presumption” of validity and the court must, if possible,
“construe, not condemn” them. See id. at 402-403 (internal quotes and citations
omitted). Even if a statute’s “outermost boundaries” are “imprecise” that fact has
little relevance where “appellant’s conduct falls squarely within the ‘hard core’ of
the statute’s proscriptions.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973);
see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 412 (citing Broadrick).
Here, Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 are not void for
vagueness, either on their face or as applied to Kerr.

As explained above,

Section 36-1304 provides that unlawfully taken wildlife may be seized by the
department of Fish and Game.

I.C. § 36-1304(b).

Further, Section 36-202

explicitly defines “take” and expressly applies that definition to the entirety of Title
36. I.C. § 36-202(i). Unlawfully taking wildlife, as defined in Section 36-202,
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accordingly subjects that wildlife to confiscation per Section 36-1304(b). Far
from being vague in any meaningful sense, the statute places persons of
ordinary intelligence on notice that if they unlawfully take wildlife, as defined by
the Code, that wildlife is subject to confiscation.
Kerr argues otherwise, contending again that “where the statute makes
clear that Kerr lawfully ‘took’ the elk when he shot and killed the elk, it is simply
not reasonable to believe that Kerr had the requisite notice to believe he, or
anyone else that lawfully harvests an animal that unfortunately happened to die
on private property, would be subject to confiscation if they trespassed to get to
the animal and pled guilty to a trespass.” (R., p. 14.) This reconstruction of the
facts, however, glosses over the fundamental point: regardless of Kerr’s actions
prior to the trespass, when Kerr “trespassed to get to the animal” he necessarily
did so unlawfully.

I.C. § 36-1603(a).

Moreover, “trespassing to get to” an

animal, followed by possessing that animal while trespassing, falls under at least
two of the unmistakable statutory definitions of takings.

I.C. § 36-202(i).

Because Kerr possessed or attempted to possess the elk while trespassing he
necessarily unlawfully took it, and subjected it to confiscation. I.C. § 36-1304(b).
Kerr was therefore reasonably on notice of the statute’s plain meaning, and its
plain application to him.
Kerr also fails to show Idaho Code Section 36-1304(b) is void for
vagueness because it “allows for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”
(See Appellant’s brief, p. 16.) Where statutory language “is sufficiently clear,”
“the speculative danger of arbitrary enforcement does not render the ordinance
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void for vagueness.” Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489, 503 (1982). Here, the language is perfectly clear: if a person
unlawfully takes wildlife then the wildlife is subject to confiscation. Because this
language is clear, any speculative danger of arbitrary enforcement does not
render the statute void for vagueness.
Kerr disagrees, protesting that the “very language” of the statutes would
lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement: “any wrongful act, regardless of
how minor, committed by any individual involved in the activity of hunting or
trapping, would subject the malfeasor in possession of a legally harvested animal
subject to confiscation.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.) But this hypothetical worstcase scenario flows from a flawed reading of the statute; it incorrectly assumes
that “any wrongful act,” as opposed to unlawful acts, would trigger the
confiscation statute. It also ignores that the hunter must have unlawfully taken
the wildlife as a predicate act. When read correctly the statutes do not subject
lawfully taken wildlife to confiscation for unrelated minor wrongdoings; they only
subject unlawfully taken wildlife to confiscation. Or in other words, as stated by
the magistrate, the common-sense effect of the statute is that “those who violate
the law while hunting, fishing, trapping, etc. ought not to profit from or get to keep
the fruits of their illegal activity.” (R., p. 21.) Kerr may disagree with the wisdom
of this as a policy matter, but he has not shown that the statutes themselves
allow for arbitrary enforcement or are otherwise void for vagueness.
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Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 are not void for vagueness,
and Kerr has accordingly failed to establish the first prong of the fundamental
error analysis.
2.

The Error Is Not Clear From The Record

Kerr has also failed to show that any error is clear from the record. An
error plainly exists if the error is clear from the record and there is not any need
for additional information, including information as to whether the failure to object
was a tactical decision. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. On
appeal, Kerr summarily contends that “the claim of error is clear without the need
for reference to any additional information not contained in the appellate record.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) But because Kerr has failed to show a constitutional
violation in the first place, Kerr fails this prong of the fundamental error analysis
for the same reason he failed the first prong. Even if there was error for the
district court to not sua sponte rule Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202
unconstitutional, that error is not clear from the record. The argument provided
by Kerr regarding “clear error” has failed to establish any error was clear from the
record.
Kerr has failed to show fundamental error.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s
decision to affirm the magistrate’s denial of Kerr’s motion to reconsider the
judgment.
DATED this 1st day of August, 2017.
_/s/ Kale D. Gans____________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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